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In a recent manuscript, Gelman & Yao (2020) claim that “the usual 
rules of conditional probability fail in the quantum realm”, and purport 
to support that statement with the example of a quantum double-slit 
experiment. Their statement is false. In fact, an opposite statement can 
be made, from two different perspectives: 
• The example given in that manuscript confirms, rather than inval- 
idates, the probability rules. The probability calculus shows that 
a particular relation between probabilities, to be discussed below, 
cannot a priori be assumed to be an equality or an inequality. In the 
quantum example it turns out to be an inequality, thus confirming 
what the probability calculus says. 
• But actually the same inequality can be shown to appear in very 
non-quantum examples, such as drawing from an urn. Thus there 
is nothing peculiar to quantum theory in this matter. 
In the present note I will prove the two points above, recalling some 
relevant literature in quantum theory. I shall also correct a couple of 
wrong or imprecise statements that Gelman & Yao make about quantum 
physics in their example. 
Let me point out at the outset that the rule of conditional probability 
(and the other two rules, sum and negation) are in fact routinely used 
in quantum theory, with full validity, especially in problems of state 
“retrodiction” and measurement reconstruction (Jones 1991; Slater 1995; 
de Muynck 2002 chs 7, 8; Barnett et al. 2003; Ziman et al. 2006; D’Ariano 
et al. 2004; see Månsson et al. 2006 § 1 and the rest of the present note 
for many further references). An example is the inference of the state 
of a quantum laser given its output through different optical apparatus 
(Leonhardt 1997). 
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 P orta M ana Conditional probability is valid in quantum theory
Similar incorrect claims with similar examples have appeared before 
in the quantum literature. Bernard O. Koopman 1 discussed the falsity of 
such claims already in 1957. The Introduction in his work is very clear: 
Ever since the advent of modern quantum mechanics in the late 1920’s, 
the idea has been prevalent that the classical laws of probability cease, in 
some sense, to be valid in the new theory. More or less explicit statements to 
this effect have been made in large number and by many of the most eminent 
workers in the new physics [. . .]. Some authors have even gone farther and 
stated that the formal structure of logic must be altered to conform to the 
terms of reference of quantum physics [. . .]. 
Such a thesis is surprising, to say the least, to anyone holding more or 
less conventional views regarding the positions of logic, probability, and 
experimental science: many of us have been apt – perhaps too naively – to 
assume that experiments can lead to conclusions only when worked up by 
means of logic and probability, whose laws seem to be on a different level 
from those of physical science. 
The primary object of this presentation is to show that the thesis in 
question is entirely without validity and is the product of a confused view 
of the laws of probability. 
A more recent claim, somewhat similar to Gelman & Yao’s and 
with a similar supporting example, was made in a work by Brukner & 
Zeilinger (2001) and disproved by Porta Mana (2004) through a step-by- 
step analysis and calculation. The fallacy in this kind of examples rests 
in the neglect of the experimental setup, leading either to an incorrect 
calculation of conditional probabilities, or to the incorrect claim that 
the probability calculus yields an equality, where it actually does not. 
The same incorrect claims can be obtained with completely non-quantum 
systems , such as drawing from an urn, if the setup is neglected (Porta 
Mana 2004 § IV). 
Let us start with such a non-quantum counter-example. 
A non-quantum counter-example Consider an urn with one B lue and 
one R ed ball. Two possible drawing setups are given: 
Da: With replacement for blue, without replacement for red. That is, if 
blue is drawn, it is put back before the next draw (and the urn is 
shaken); if red is drawn, it is thrown away before the next draw. 
Db: With replacement for red, without replacement for blue.
1 of the Pitman-Koopman theorem for sufficient statistics, Koopman 1936. 
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These two setups are obviously mutually exclusive. 
We can easily find the unconditional probability for blue at the second 
draw in the setup Da: 
P ( B2 | Da)  34 . (1) 
Note that this probability can be intuitively found by simple enumeration, 
à la Boole, with a “possible worlds” diagram. Out of four possible worlds, 
half of which has blue at the first draw, and the other half has red, we 
can count that three worlds have blue at the second draw. 
The conditional probabilities for blue at the second draw, conditional 
on the first draw, are also easily found: 
P ( B2 | B1 ∧ Da)  12 P ( B2 | R1 ∧ Da)  1 . (2) 
We find that 
P ( B2 | Da)  P ( B2 | B1∧ Da) P ( B1 | Da) + P ( B2 | R1∧ Da) P ( R1 | Da) , (3) 
which is just the rule of conditional probability. It is in fact just the 
systematization and generalization of the intuitive “possible worlds” 
reasoning done above. 
Now consider the setup Db. We easily find 
P ( B2 | Db)  14 , (4) 
P ( B2 | B1 ∧ Db)  0 P ( B2 | R1 ∧ Db)  12 , (5) 
P ( B2 | Db)  P ( B2 | B1 ∧ Db) P ( B1 | Db) + P ( B2 | R1 ∧ Db) P ( R1 | Db) . 
(6) 
Now compare the unconditional probability for blue at the second 
draw in the setup Da, with the conditional probabilities for blue at the 
second draw given the first draw in the setup Db: 
P ( B2 | Da) , P ( B2 | B1∧ Db) P ( B1 | Db) + P ( B2 | R1∧ Db) P ( R1 | Db) . (7) 
This inequality is not surprising – we are comparing different setups. It is 
not an instance of the conditional-probability rule. In fact the probability 
calculus has nothing to say, a priori, about the relation between the left 
side and right side, which are conditional on different statements or, if 
you like, pertain to two different sample spaces. 
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You can call the inequality above “interference” if you want; for 
further examples see Kirkpatrick (2003a,b) and Porta Mana (2004 § IV). 
Now consider another pair of drawing setups: setup Dc, with replace- 
ment for both colours; and setup Dd, without replacement for either 
colour. You can easily find that 
P ( B2 | Dc)  P ( B2 | B1 ∧ Dc) P ( B1 | Dc) + P ( B2 | R1 ∧ Dc) P ( R1 | Dc) , 
(8) 
P ( B2 | Dd)  P ( B2 | B1 ∧ Dd) P ( B1 | Dd) + P ( B2 | R1 ∧ Dd) P ( R1 | Dd) , 
(9) 
P ( B2 | Dc)  P ( B2 | B1 ∧ Dd) P ( B1 | Dd) + P ( B2 | R1 ∧ Dd) P ( R1 | Dd) . 
(10) 
The first two equalities above are expressions of the conditional- 
probability rule. The third is not , however. It is simply a peculiar equality 
contingent on the two specific setups. 
The probability calculus therefore correctly handles situations leading 
to inequalities such as (7), and to equalities such as (10). 
The explicit presence of ‘ D . . . ’, which represents given information, 
is necessary discussions involving different setups, such as the above. If 
I ask you “what’s the probability of blue at the second draw?”, you will 
ask me “in which drawing setup?”. The probability is conditional on the 
information about the drawing scheme. 
The inequality (7) is what Gelman & Yao (2020 p. 2) complain about, 
but in the context of a pair of quantum setups. I do not see how one 
can complain about it, or claim inconsistencies. It is obviously correct 
even from an intuitive analysis of the two setups. And the probability 
calculus correctly leads to it, too. The probability calculus correctly leads 
also to the equality (10) . As already said, given two mutually exclusive 
setups, the probability calculus a priori neither commits to an equality 
nor to an inequality. 
I will now show that the simple example above is in fact conceptually 
quite close to the quantum experiment mentioned by Gelman & Yao. The 
closeness is especially clear from the experimental and mathematical 
developments of quantum theory of the past 40 years (at the very least), 
as the literature cited below shows. 
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The quantum two-slit experiments The basic argument of Gelman & 
Yao is that, in a given setup of the quantum two-slit experiment, we have 
a specific probability distribution for the appearance of an emulsion or 
excitation on some point of the screen. We can call this a “screen detec- 
tion”, but please keep in mind that in so doing we are adding an extra 
interpretation that modern quantum theory does not actually commit to 
(see discussion and references below). In a different experimental setup 
we have conditional probabilities for screen detection conditional on 
slit detection. Now, the probability of the first setup is not equal to the 
combination of the conditional probabilities of the second setup. 
But this is exactly what happened in our urn example above, eq. (7) . 
In the present quantum case we do not have a violation of the conditional 
probability rule either – if anything it is a confirmation. 
To see the analogy more clearly, let me present some additional facts 
from quantum theory. 
The experimental setup without detectors at the slits and the setup 
with slit detectors are actually limit cases of a continuum of experimental 
setups (Wootters & Zurek 1979; for a recent review and further references 
see Banaszek et al. 2013). In the general case, such a setup has slit detectors 
of varying efficiency, denoted by a parameter q ∈ [ 0 , 1 ] that can be chosen 
in the setup. The possible degrees of efficiency are of course mutually 
exclusive, so these setups are mutually exclusive. 
The slit detector has a given efficiency in the following sense: 
Let us call y the detection position on the screen, and X1 is the 
statement that detection occurs at slit #1 (you can translate to random- 
variable jargon if you prefer). When we prepare the electromagnetic field 
in a quantum state S , and use ideal detectors with perfect efficiency, the 
probability of detection at slit #1 is, say pS, and 1 − pS for slit #2. 
If we use the setup with detectors having efficiency q – denote it by 
Dq – then the probability of detection at slit #1 is 
p ( X1 | Dq , S )  12 ( 1 − q ) + q pS , (11) 
and 12 ( 1 + q ) − q pS for slit #2. 
The setup with perfect detectors is the limit case q  1 . In the case of 
zero efficiency, q  0 , there is no relation between the light states and 
the firing of the slit detectors; that is, we are always fully uncertain as 
to which detector would fire, no matter how the light state is prepared. 
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These kinds of setup – and many other interesting ones – are quite 
easy to prepare with the statistically analogous quantum Mach-Zehnder 
interferometers (see the textbooks in footnote 2 below; Leonhardt 1997 
§ 4.2; Yuen & Shapiro 1978). 
In each setup Dq (and given the light state S ) we also have the 
conditional probability distribution p ( y | Dq , S ) for detection at y on the 
screen, and the conditional probability distributions p ( y | X , Dq , S ) for 
detection at y on the screen, given detection X at the slits. We have 
p ( y | Dq , S )  
p ( y | X1 , Dq , S ) p ( X1 | Dq , S ) + p ( y | X2 , Dq , S ) p ( X2 | Dq , S ) . (12) 
This is an instance of the conditional-probability rule, which is of course 
valid. This equality also holds for long-run frequencies (see point ( iii ) 
below). Note that such conditional and unconditional frequencies are 
experimentally observed. I would like you to convince yourself, though, 
that the equality above (not the specific values of the frequencies) is not 
an experimental fact, since it rests on the very definition of conditional 
frequency. 
The conditional and unconditional distributions above will of course 
be different depending on the setup Dq and the light state S . But in each 
instance the rule of conditional probability holds. 
Now let me discuss a couple of very interesting experimental facts 
about this collection of setups: 
First, both the conditional and unconditional probability (or long-run 
frequency) distributions for the screen detection y generally have an 
oscillatory profile, typical of interference (Wootters & Zurek 1979; Banaszek 
et al. 2013; see also Chiao et al. 1995 for further variations). The oscillatory 
character is maximal for the zero-efficiency setup q  0 and decreases as 
q increases. For the perfect-detector setup q  1 there is no interference. 
But we can have quite a lot of interference even when the detection 
efficiency is quite low, so that for some light states we are almost certain 
about slit detection; see references above. (The profile depends on the 
specific light state, of course, which we are assuming fixed.) 
Second, the unconditional (frequency) distribution that we observe in 
the setup without slit detectors is experimentally equal to that observed 
in the setup D0 with zero-efficiency slit detectors. 
6
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Third, one conditional distribution observed in the setup with one 
slit closed is experimentally equal to one in the setup D1 with perfect slit 
detectors. (Here we must be careful, because there is no slit detection in 
the second setup; rather, we speak of appearance or non-appearance at 
the screen, and in the latter case no conditional distribution is defined.) 
The equalities in the last two cases should a priori not be expected, 
because the setups are physically different. Of course one can look for 
physical, “hidden variables” explanations of such equalities. Experi- 
mental quantum optics simply acknowledges the fact that two setups are 
equivalent for such detection purposes, and incorporates this information 
into its mathematical formalism (see below). 
Note the statistical analogy between the cases above and the cases 
with the setups of the urn examples previously discussed. In each setup, 
the rule of conditional probability holds (and in the quantum case we 
can have distributions, conditional and unconditional, with oscillatory 
profiles). Across different setups, probability theory says that such a rule 
cannot be applied; and indeed we find inequalities across some setups 
and equalities across others, both in the quantum and non-quantum 
case, eqs (7), (10). 
It is also possible to consider situations in which we are uncertain 
about which measurement setup applies. For example we may not know 
whether there were slit detectors, or the value q of the detector efficiency. 
In such situations we introduce probabilities p ( D . . .) for the possible 
setups and the conditional-probability rule applies, yielding for example 
p ( y | S )  ∑ q p ( y | Dq , S ) p ( Dq) (13) 
(here our knowledge of the state was assumed to be irrelevant to our 
inference about the setup). Then, given the measurement outcome, we 
can make inferences about the setup (Barnett et al. 2003; Ziman et al. 
2006; D’Ariano et al. 2004; see also Rigo et al. 1998) – for example 
whether a slit detector was present or not – again using the conditional- 
probability rule in the guise of Bayes’s theorem. This kind of inference is 
especially important in quantum key distribution (Nielsen & Chuang 
2010), where we try to infer whether a third party was eavesdropping, 
that is, performing a covert measurement. Again no violations of the 
probability rules in the quantum realm; quite the opposite, those rules 
allow us to make important inferences. 
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Further remarks and curiosities about quantum two-slits experiments I 
would like to mention a couple more experimental facts – which are, 
besides, statistically very interesting – to correct some statements by 
Gelman & Yao in relation to the two-slit experiment. 
( i ) It does matter whether many photons are sent at once, or one 
at a time (cf. Gelman & Yao 2020 § 2 point 1); as well as their 
wavelength, temporal spread, and so on (strictly speaking, the 
spatio-temporal dependence of the field mode). These details are 
part of the specification of the light state S mentioned above, and 
lead to different probabilities distributions of screen detection. 
For example, in some setups and for some states we can have 
a detection probability density p ( y1) for the first photon, and a 
different density for the second photon p ( y2 | y1) , conditional on the 
detection of the first – both being different from the cumulative 
density of detections. See e.g. the phenomena of higher-order 
coherence, bunching, anti-bunching, and many other interesting 
ones 2 . Interference phenomena can also be observed in time, not 
only in space. The rules of the probability calculus also apply in all 
such situations. We can infer, for example, the position of the first 
photon detection given the second from the conditional probability 
rule p ( y1 | y2) ∝ p ( y2 | y1) p ( y1) . 
( ii ) The details about the light source and the setup are not “latent 
variables”: they specify the quantum state of light and the meas- 
urement performed on it. They are like the initial and boundary 
conditions necessary for the specification of the behaviour of any 
physical system. 
( iii ) In view of point ( i ) above, it is important not to conflate the probab- 
ility distributions for single-photon detections, those for cumulative 
photon detection, and the frequency distributions of a long-run of 
such detections (Gelman & Yao 2020 § 2, seem to conflate the two). 
Such distinction is always important from a Bayesian point of view. 
I may add that the idea and parlance of “photons passing through 
slits” are used today only out of tradition; maybe a little poetically. The
2 for example Mandel & Wolf 1965; Morgan & Mandel 1966; Paul 1982; Jacobson et al. 
1995; and textbooks such as Loudon 2000; Mandel & Wolf 2008; Scully & Zubairy 2001; 
Bachor & Ralph 2004; Walls & Milburn 1994 
8
 P orta M ana Conditional probability is valid in quantum theory
technical parlance, as routinely used in quantum-optics labs for example 
(Leonhardt 1997; Bachor & Ralph 2004), has a different underlying 
picture. The ‘ system ’ in a quantum-optics experiment is not photons, 
but the modes of the field-configuration operator 2 (note that this is 
not yet Quantum ElectroDynamics). “Photon numbers” denote the 
discrete outcomes of a specific energy-measurement operator; “photon 
states” denote specific states of the field operators. As another example, 
“entanglement” is strictly speaking not among photons, but among 
modes of the field operator (van Enk 2003). Several quantum physicists 
indeed oppose the idea and parlance of “photons”, owing to the confusion 
they lead to. Lamb 3 wrote in 1995: 
the author does not like the use of the word “photon”, which dates from 
1926. In his view, there is no such thing as a photon. Only a comedy of errors 
and historical accidents led to its popularity among physicists and optical 
scientists. 
Wald (1994) warns: 
standard treatments of quantum field theory in flat spacetime rely heavily 
on Poincaré symmetry (usually entering the analysis implicitly via plane- 
wave expansions) and interpret the theory primarily in terms of a notion 
of “particles”. Neither Poincaré (or other) symmetry nor a useful notion of 
“particles” exists in a general, curved spacetime, so a number of the familiar 
tools and concepts of field theory must be “unlearned” in order to have a 
clear grasp of quantum field theory in curved spacetime. [p. ix] [. . .] the 
notion of “particles” plays no fundamental role either in the formulation or 
interpretation of the theory. [p. 2] 
See also Davies’s Particles do not exist (1984). 
A summary of the modern formalism of quantum theory It may be use- 
ful to give a summary of how probability enters the modern formalism 
of quantum theory. See textbooks such as Holevo (2011), Busch et al. 
(1995), Peres (1995 especially ch. 12), de Muynck (2002 especially ch. 3), 
and the excellent text by Bengtsson & Życzkowski (2017). 
A quantum system is defined by its sets of possible states and possible 
measurements. A state ρ is represented by an Hermitean, positive- 
definite, unit-trace matrix ρ (which satisfies additional mathematical 
properties: Jakóbczyk & Siennicki 2001; Kimura 2003; Kimura &
3 of the Lamb shift, Lamb & Retherford 1947. 
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Kossakowski 2005; Bengtsson & Życzkowski 2017), called ‘ density 
matrix ’. States traditionally represented by kets | ψ ⟩ are just special 
cases of density matrices. A measurement setup M is represented by 
a set of Hermitean, positive-definite matrices { Mr } (of the same order 
as the density matrices) adding up to the identity matrix. They are 
called ‘ positive-operator-valued measures ’, usually abbreviated povm s. 
Traditional von Neumann projection operators {| ϕr⟩⟨ ϕr |} are just special 
cases of povm s. Each matrix Mr is associated with an outcome r of the 
measurement. These outcomes are mutually exclusive. An outcome can 
actually represent a combination of simpler outcomes, r ≡ ( x , y , z , . . . ) , 
such as the intensities or firings at two or more detectors. 
The probability of observing outcome r ≡ ( x , y , . . . ) given the meas- 
urement setup M and the state S is encoded in the trace-product of the 
respective matrices: 
p ( x , y , . . . | M ∧ S ) ≡ tr ( Mx , y , . . . ρ ) , (14) 
These probabilities for all r form a probability distribution. The tra- 
ditional Born-rule expression ‘ |⟨ ϕr | ψ ⟩|2 ’ is just a special case of the 
above formula. The probabilities in the formula come from repeated 
measurement experiences in the same experimental conditions – we can 
invoke de Finetti’s theorem here, and some quantum physicists indeed 
do (Caves et al. 2002; van Enk & Fuchs 2002; Fuchs et al. 2004). The 
trace-product above is just a scalar product in a particular space. How 
a set of probability or frequency distributions can be encoded in scalar 
products is explained in a down-to-earth way in Porta Mana (2003). 
Once the probability distribution above is given we can use the 
full-fledged probability calculus for our inferences. We can for example 
sum (or integrate) over detector outcomes y , . . . , obtaining the marginal 
probability for detector outcome x ; or calculate the probability of outcome 
y conditional on x ; or make inferences about the measurement setup or 
the state. (Again, there are no violations of the probability rules.) The 
formalism (14) is neat in this respect because it allows us to represent 
such situations through new povm s and density matrices. You can easily 
check, for example, that the marginal probability for x from eq. (14) can be 
encoded in the povm { M′x} ≡ { 
∑ 
y , . . . Mx , y , . . .} . A situation of uncertainty 
between setups M′ and M′′, as in eq. (13) , can be encoded in the povm{
p ( M′) M′r + p ( M′′) M′′r 
}
. And so on, and similarly for states and their 
density operators. 
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For systems with infinite degrees of freedom such as electromagnetic 
fields or electrons (Fermionic fields), the matrices above are actually 
operators defined in particular algebras. A povm element can actually 
be a space-time-valued operator. The computational details can become 
quite complicated, but the same basic ideas apply. 
This formalism obviously also includes the specification of post- 
measurement states (if the system still exists afterwards), transformations, 
and so on. I shall not discuss these; see the textbooks cited above. 
Conclusions I hope that the above discussion and bibliography clearly 
show that: 
• the rules of probability theory, including the conditional-probability 
one, are fully valid in quantum theory; 
• some peculiar equalities or inequalities across different experi- 
mental conditions do not contradict the conditional-probability 
rule, and they appear just as well in quantum as in non-quantum 
systems, such as drawing from an urn. 
Quantum theory already has its physically conceptual difficulties 
and in some cases computational difficulties, as should be clear from 
the portrait given in the present note. I do not see the point in making it 
seem even more difficult with false claims of non-validity of probability 
theory or with distorted pictures of its experimental content. 
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